The
philosophes condemned war as a foolish waste of life and resources in stupid quarrels of no value to humankind. Rulers, however, paid little attention to these comments and continued their costly struggles. By the eighteenth century, the European system of self-governing, individual states was grounded largely in the principle of self-interest. Because international relations were based on considerations of power, the eighteenth-century concept of a balance of power was predicated on how to counterbalance the power of one state by another to prevent anyone state from dominating the others. This balance of power, however, did not imply a desire for peace. Large armies created to defend a state’s security were often used for offensive purposes as well. As Frederick the Great of Prussia remarked, “The fundamental rule of governments is the principle of extending their territories.” Nevertheless, the regular use of diplomacy served at times to lead to compromise.
The diplomacy of the eighteenth century still focused primarily on dynastic interests, or the desire of ruling families to provide for their dependents and extend their dynastic holdings. But the eighteenth century also saw the emergence of the concept of reason of state, on the basis of which a ruler such as Frederick II and a minister such as William Pitt the Elder looked beyond dynastic interests to the long-term future of their states.
International rivalry and the continuing centralization of the European states were closely related. The need for money to support the new standing armies, navies, and weapons of war that had originated in the seventeenth century created its own imperative for more efficient and effective control of power in the hands of bureaucrats who could collect taxes and organize states for the task of winning wars. At the same time, the development of large standing armies ensured that political disputes would periodically be resolved by armed conflict rather than diplomacy. Between 1715 and 1740, Europe seemed to prefer peace. But in 1740, a major conflict erupted over the succession to the Austrian throne.
The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748)
Unable to produce a male heir to the Austrian throne, the Habsburg emperor Charles VI (1711-1740) so feared the consequences of the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa that he spent much of his reign negotiating the Pragmatic Sanction, by which various European powers agreed to recognize his daughter as his legal heir.
After Charles’s death, however, the Pragmatic Sanction was conveniently pushed aside, especially by Frederick II, who had recently succeeded to the throne of Prussia. The new Prussian ruler took advantage of the new empress to invade Austrian Silesia. The vulnerability of Maria Theresa encouraged France to enter the war against its traditional enemy Austria; in turn, Maria Theresa made an alliance with Great Britain, which feared French hegemony over Continental affairs. All too quickly, the Austrian succession had set off a worldwide conflagration. The war was fought not only in Europe, where Prussia seized Silesia and France occupied the Austrian Netherlands, but in the East, where France took Madras (now Chennai) in India from the British, and in North America, where the British captured the French fortress of Louisbourg at the entrance to the Saint Lawrence River. By 1748, all parties were exhausted and agreed to stop. The peace treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (ex-lah-shah-PELL) promised the return of all occupied territories except Silesia to their original owners. Prussia’s refusal to return Silesia guaranteed another war, at least between the two hostile central European powers of Prussia and Austria.
The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763)
Maria Theresa refused to accept the loss of Silesia and prepared for its return by rebuilding her army while working diplomatically through her able foreign minister, Count Wenzel von Kaunitz (VENT-sul fun KOW-nits), to separate Prussia from its chief ally, France. In 1756, Austria achieved what was soon labeled a diplomatic revolution. Bourbon-Habsburg rivalry had been a fact of European diplomacy since the late sixteenth century. But two new rivalries made this old one seem superfluous: Britain and France over colonial empires, and Austria and Prussia over Silesia. France now abandoned Prussia and allied with Austria. Russia, which saw Prussia as a major hindrance to Russian goals in central Europe, joined the new alliance. In turn, Great Britain allied with Prussia. This diplomatic revolution of 1756 now led to another war, with three major areas of conflict: Europe, India, and North America (see
Map 18.3). Indeed, the Seven Years’ War could be seen, as some historians have argued, as the first world war.
CONFLICT IN EUROPE Europe witnessed the clash of the two major alliances: the British and Prussians against the Austrians, Russians, and French. With his superb army and military prowess, Frederick the Great was able for some time to defeat the Austrian, French, and Russian armies. At the Battle of Rossbach (RAWSS-bahkh) in Saxony in 1757, he won a spectacular victory over combined French-Austrian forces that far outnumbered his own troops. Under attack from three different directions, however, Frederick’s forces were gradually worn down and faced utter defeat when they were saved by the death of Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia (1741-1762), which brought her nephew Peter III to power. A great admirer of Frederick the Great, Peter withdrew the Russian troops from the conflict and from the Prussian lands that they had occupied. His withdrawal guaranteed a stalemate and led to a desire for peace. The European conflict was ended by the Peace of Hubertusburg (hoo-BERR-toos-bayrk) in 1763. All occupied territories were returned, and Austria officially recognized Prussia’s permanent control of Silesia.
WAR IN INDIA The Anglo-French struggle in the rest of the world had more decisive results. Known as the Great War for Empire, it was fought in India and North America. The French had returned Madras (muh-DRAS or muh-DRAHS) to Britain after the War of the Austrian Succession, but jockeying for power continued as the French and British supported opposing native Indian princes. The British under Robert Clive (1725-1774) ultimately won out, not because they had better forces but because they were more persistent (see the box on p. 546). By the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the French withdrew and left India to the British.
THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR By far the greatest conflicts of the Seven Years’ War took place in North America, where it was known as the French and Indian War. There were two primary areas of contention. One consisted of the waterways of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, guarded by the fortress of Louisbourg and by forts near the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain that protected French Quebec and French traders. The other was the unsettled Ohio River valley. As the French moved south from the Great Lakes and north from their garrisons along the Mississippi, they began to establish forts from the Appalachians to the Mississippi River. To British settlers in the thirteen colonies to the east, this French activity threatened to cut off a vast area from British expansion. The French found allies among the Indians, who considered the French traders less threatening than the British settlers.
Despite initial French successes, British fortunes were revived by the efforts of William Pitt the Elder, who was convinced that the destruction of the French colonial empire was a necessary prerequisite for the creation of Britain’s own colonial empire. Accordingly, Pitt decided to make a minimal effort in Europe while concentrating resources, especially the British navy, on the colonial war. Although the French troops were greater in number, the ability of the French to use them in the New World was contingent on naval support. The defeat of French fleets in major naval battles in 1759 gave the British an advantage since the French could no longer easily reinforce their garrisons. A series of British victories soon followed. Already in 1758, the British had captured Forts Louisbourg and Duquesne. Then, on the night of September 13, 1759, British forces led by General James Wolfe scaled the heights outside Quebec and defeated the French under General Louis-Joseph Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham. Both generals died in the battle. The British went on to seize Montreal, the Great Lakes area, and the Ohio valley. The French were forced to make peace. By the Treaty of Paris, they ceded Canada and the lands east of the Mississippi to Britain. Their ally Spain transferred Spanish Florida to British control; in return, the French gave their Louisiana territory to the Spanish. By 1763, Great Britain had become the world’s greatest colonial power.
European Armies and Warfare
The professional standing army, initiated in the seventeenth century, became a standard feature of eighteenth-century Europe. Especially noticeable was the increase in the size of armies, which paralleled the development of absolutist states. Between 1740 and 1780, the French army grew from 190,000 to 300,000 men; the Prussian, from 83 ,000 to 200,000; the Austrian, from 108,000 to 282,000; and the Russian, from 130,000 to 290,000.
THE NATURE OF WARFARE The dramatic increase in the size of armies and navies did not necessarily result in more destructive warfare in eighteenth-century Europe. For one thing, war was no longer driven by ideology as the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been. By their very nature, ideological wars are often violent and destructive. Moreover, since the larger armies depended on increased tax revenues, rulers regarded the wanton destruction of civilian taxpayers as foolish. Finally, the costliness of eighteenth-century armies as well as the technology and customary tactics of the age created a system of warfare based on limited objectives.
Since generals were extremely reluctant to risk the destruction of their armies in pitched battles, they came to rely on clever and elaborate maneuvers, rather than direct confrontation. A system of formalities accepted by all sides allowed defeated opponents to withdraw without being captured or destroyed. This mentality also encouraged the construction of vast fortresses to secure major roads and the enormous quantities of supplies needed by eighteenth-century armies. With its own set patterns of tactics, siege warfare often became, as one French critic said disgustedly, “the art of surrendering strongholds honorably after certain conventional formalities.” Nevertheless, despite the maneuvering and the sieges, European warfare in the eighteenth century also involved many battles and considerable risk.
Next Reading: 18.4 (Economic Expansion and Social Change)